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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(i) (1953 as amended) whereby a defendant in a
criminal case may take an appeal to the Supreme Court from a
conviction and final judgment involving a conviction of a first
degree felony.

IV

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

1.

Did the admission into evidence and publication of

Mr, Albretson's mug shot deny him a fair trial?
2.

Did the failure to grant defense counsel's objection

to surprise alibi rebuttal testimony deny Mr. Albretson due process?

v

TEXTS OF STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL I\-A.

Rule -~° 3 ^^ *-^** n'.;
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury,
considerations of undue delay, waste on ti in e , c • ] :
needless presentation of ci imi i] ative evidence.
Rule . <

.«•- • -

Rules ot Evidence ii^o-; provides:

Cnaracte. evi-j^nc*- n c ^ LP ssibi- \ • :^)ve
conduct; exceptions; ?ti •- "rimes.
'a' Character evidence generan^,
OL ^ pei'.-Ajp.': character or a trait of his
character is not aimissibb f ?r "he purpose o?
proving that he acted in confer:;ty therew:-particular occasion, except:
v 4. / Character of a^-?..;ed. Evidence of
a pertinent trait of n s character offered v"
an accused, •~,r Vs" •• -^ ^ ^ - ' ^ n H . v i - ^ b u u
the same;
;naracter of victim. Evidence; ,;. a
pertinent trait of character of the vi:tLp
the crime offered by an accused, or by t;>
prosecution to rebu- -he sa:ne, -.- evidence
a character trait of peacefulness of tne
victim offered by the prosecution in a
homicide case to rebut evidence tha*: t ^
victim wa.^ the first aggressor;
(3) Character of witness.
vidence of
th^ character OL a wL".:ie *?. as provider
Rules 60", 608, and 609.
'l
Other crimes, wrongs ,.. a^ , . -,-dence
o:
-rimes, wrongs or acts is no- admitsinle
to pcov^ ^ :>- character af a person in order to
show that he acted in conformity therewith. it
may, however, be admissible for other purposes,
such as proof of .-jtwe, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, know L e d ^ id^nti*-- ^ -^ ^ ^ *e
of mist-ake o- accident.

Utah Code "

r " -"• <

n

noco

is amende, * provider:

Alii

'*-i-'.e Lc^uLLeiaents- -Witness lists.
• defendant, whether or not written
, ^as been made, who intends to offer
evidence of an alibi -hall, not less than ten days
before trial or ac such other time as the court
may allow, file and serve on the prosecuting
attorney a notice, in writing, of his intention to
claim alibi. The not ice sha11 contain spec if ic
information as to the place where the defendant
claims to have been at the time of the alleged
offense and, as particularly as is known to the
defendant or his attorney, the nam.es and addresses
of the witnesses by whom he proposes to establish
alibi. The prosecuting attorney, not more than
five days after receipt of the list provided
herein or at such other time as the court may
direct, shall file and serve the defendant with
the addresses, as particularly as are known to
him, of the witnesses the state proposes to offer
to contradi ct or i mpeach 11 1 e defendant f s alibi
evidence.
(2) The defendant and prosecuting attorney
shall be under a continuing duty to disclose the
names and addresses of additional witnesses which
come to the a11ention of either party af ter f i Iing
their alibi witness lists.
(3) If a defendant or prosecuting attorney
fails to comply with the requirements of this
section, the court may exclude evidence offered to
establish or rebut alibi. However, the defendant
may always testify on his own behalf concerning
a 1ibi
( 4 ) «p he c o u r t HI a y , £ o r g o o d c a u s e s 1 i o w n ,
waive the requirements of this section.

v i i

i'HE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
-: i: /Rp3oondent,

P I HI
^7

DOUGLAS R. ALBRETSON,

Case No. 330154
P r i o *• i t "

-,\

J

.41.:

.. r-. {

JL

.

t .

STATEMENT OF
innpa! fr ;n

•J

*-rr

!ii c^n ; i ^t i ,ri
LuxdLiun

Aj;: ,

Code Ann . S

ihj

felon-

' n

"

d., .i i«-n :e I
" - i'

r

>r

^ -ah

j :

- , a secon • >-J: ^.

i '-;

. M i 1^-5 3 as anended)

i n aec ._ :a:.
i

f o ; . owi na a

Ann*

a1-- j ' ^m^y, Stdi^ -^r UtV;

" Let Cou * *
t;i-r ,'lonorar. .

Raymond

I'hl'jM ,

:~ -'ATIO^ENT
*<•*

', ; 4 -

iuroen Leiv'
* * * ^ '"

>F_FACTS
' : 3f 1

| > . in

<::: n l 3

: f ne i • r .• ,v, - v ' o n -r hone
n.vi^^ P->*- d few minutes, she
i i I i 'h o n

she approached
u

d cor a c:

'

"" " :n^id'- - ^

,.

^

1 jr

'J,J i

J

L':IH end ^f ' %,e na.iwav, a -v-tn .
*

V 3 suddenly stepper xn ^ ^ I L „f ne: :r„ : _eiind

The man was approximately two feet away from Ms. Leavitt,
and she saw him for approximately three seconds before she was hit
in the head and left unconscious (T. 21, 24, 50).
Ms. Leavitt was subsequently hospitalized for her
injuries.

After her release, and three days after the incident,

Detective Hutchison left a book of pictures with Ms. Leavitt's
husband in hopes that Ms. Leavitt could identify her assailant among
the pictures (T. 38). Ms. Leavitt looked through the book
containing thirty to fifty photos, then stated to her husband,
n

[t]his looks like the man that beat me" (T. 38-9).

The photo

Ms. Leavitt selected was that of the defendant, Douglas Albretson
(T. 54).
That night, Ms. Leavitt also told Detective Hutchison
that the photo looked like the assailant.

The next day, Detective

Hutchison showed Ms. Leavitt a piece of cardboard with six pictures
attached.

Ms. Leavitt again selected the photograph of

Mr. Albretson (T. 39-40, 55).
On July 22, 1987, Mr. Albretson filed a Notice of Intent
to Rely on the Defense of Alibi as required by Utah Code Ann.
§77-14-2(1) (1953 as amended).

The defendant listed Brenda Davis

and Cindy Edwards as alibi witnesses (R. 22).

(Addendum A ) . On

July 27, 1987, defendant filed an amended notice which contained a
change of address for Brenda Davis (R. 24).

(Addendum B ) . The

State filed its Reply to Notice of Alibi on July 30, 1987.

In its

reply notice, the State listed Officer Brandt Hutchison of the Salt
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0.
Y o u c h o s e a p h o t o g r a p h that r e s e m b l e d the
p e r s o n y o u r e m e m b e r e d s e e i n g at that poi n t ; i s
tnat c o r r e c t ?
Yes .
T h e n y u u Lu±w J- ... a u u c h x s ^ .
you felt looked like the p e r s o n ?
Yes T - * 1 ^ ' - : ' " "". [

Q.
A day or two later Det. Hutchison brought you
the exhibit that I believe is State's No. 8, the
photograph exhibit; is that correct?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And you picked one out?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Mr. Albretson's picture was in that document,
wasn't it?
A.
Yes, it was.
Q.
And you recognized it?
A.
Yes.
Q.
It was a picture of the same personf Doug
Albretsen, a picture of (sic)?
• • . . *

Q.
When you first saw the first photograph in
the book of photographs that Det. Hutchison left
for you to look at, what is it you said to your
husband?
A.
I said, "This looks like the man that beat
me."
Q.
All right. Nothing further.
(T. 54-6).
On direct examination, the prosecutor questioned
Ms. Leavitt regarding the differences between the first and second
photograph of the man she had identified as her assailant, which
photograph appeared to be the more recent, and her reasons for
picking the second photograph (T. 56-7).

On re-cross-examination,

defense counsel directed three questions to Ms. Leavitt, asking if
she could discern whether the first and second photographs were of
the same man (T. 58).
Following the testimony of another witness, the
prosecutor asked outside the presence of the jury that the two
photographs Ms. Leavitt selected as her assailant be shown to the
jury.

The prosecutor told the Court that the numbers and words

"Salt Lake County" which were on the photograph taken from the book
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M s . D a v i s , 11 i e prosecuto r extensively questioned Ms . D avis a s t o t h e
details of the route taken tl irough Parley's Way and

Emigration

Canyon (T. 95-7).
After the defense rested, the prosecutor informed the
Court that he intended to present rebuttal testimony but that it
would take some time to obtain the witness (T. 114). Following a
short recess, the State had not yet located the witness and
suggested that the Court take its noon recess, after which time the
State would present its rebuttal witness (T. 115).
Defendant made a motion that evidence be closed at that
time and pointed out that the defense had not been informed of a
rebuttal witness named Mr. Miller with the Department of
Transportation and that it was not appropriate for the Court to
allow the State to "go find a witness who has not been anticipated
and the defense has not been made aware of in an alibi case. . . ."
(T. 116). The Court denied the motion and recessed the Court for
its noon recess at 11:39 a.m. to reconvene at 1:45 p.m. (T. 117,
119).

Defense counsel again objected to the State's preferred

rebuttal witness in chambers (T. 120-4).
Following the noon recess, the State presented the
testimony of Richard Miller, an employee of the Utah Department of
Transportation.

Mr. Miller testified that State Road 65 was closed

during the time that Ms. Davis testified that she and Mr. Albretson
drove through Parley's Way and Emigration Canyon (T. 125-129).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court committed prejudicial error in admitting
and publishing a mug shot of Mr. Albretson to the jury.
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POINT I
[jpiciAL ERROR IN
ADMITTING AND PUBLISHING A MUG SHOT OF DEFENDANT,
TH£

TRIAL

CQURT

CQMMITTED

pREJ

Police photographs or mug shots have been around
for well over a half a century and prosecutors
have avoided using them as borne out by the fact
th&t Taylor is the only Mississippi case that we
can find where they were introduced into
evidence. This case comes on the heels of
Taylor. We would point out before the practice
becomes widespread, that the ilse of mug shots
except when absolutely necessary, is inviting
error
Sloan v. State, 4 37 S o . 2d ] 6, J 8 r • 1

(Miss. 1 9 8TT
A.
ADMISSION AND PUBLICATION O?
IN H E R E N T L Y P R h - Jr J ) IC M T•, .
:-

v-j o? c a s e s b e i i n n i i ^ ;

J-)

SHOT W A S
C o u:

- as

establishes or implies other criminal conduct by the defendant.

See

e.g. State v. Pacheco, 712 P„2d 192 (Utah 1985); State v. Saunders,
699 P.2d 192 (Utah 1985); State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 738 (Utah
1980); and State v. Gotfrey, 598 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1979).

The Court

has reached its decisions based on the prohibition in the Rules of
Evidence against the use of prior bad acts to prove character (see
Pacheco, 712 P.2d at 195 1 ) as well as the constitutional guarantee
in both the state and federal constitutions of due process and a
fair trial for a criminal defendant.

(See e.g. McCumber, 722 P.2d

at 356; Saunders, 699 P.2d at 741-2; State v. Tarafa, 720 P.2d 1368,
1370 (Utah 1986) . )
In Saunders, 699 P.2d at 741, this Court noted the Rules
of Evidence are designed to protect against undue prejudice which
would be caused by the jury's knowledge of a defendant's other
criminal acts.
Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence (1983) provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in
order to show that he acted in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for
other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
In State v.Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 496 (Utah 1988)
(Zimmerman, J. concurring in the result, joined in part by
Stewart, A.C.J, and Durham, J . ) , Justice Zimmerman discussed the

1

Pacheco was decided pursuant to Rule 55 of the former
Rules of Evidence. Rule 55 was the predecessor to Rule 404(b) of
the Utah Rules of Evidence (1983).

- 8

-

application of Rules 403 and 404 to evidence of other crimes.2

He

pointed out that n[t]he present Utah Rules of Evidence
embody . . . [a] long-standing common-law approach to evidence of
prior crimes or bad character" which disfavors the use of such
evidence during the guilt phase of a trial,

jjd.

He further noted:

[Rule 404(b)] permits introduction of evidence of
prior crimes or bad acts to prove certain facts
relevant to pending charges, but only if the
evidence is admissible under rule 403, i.e., only
if the danger of unfair prejudice does not
outweigh the probative value of the evidence,
[footnote omitted]
Id.
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence (1983) provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
In State v. Holder, 694 P.2d 583 (Utah 1984), this Court
reversed the defendant's conviction under Rule 45, the predecessor
to Rule 403, because the probative value of evidence of a robbery
which occurred twenty minutes prior to the incident charged was
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.

This Court

pointed out:
The merely cumulative character of the robbery evidence
on the element of knowledge and intent regarding the
theft charge is significant because it highlights the
limited value this evidence has when weighed against the
substantial possibility that a jury would be prejudiced

2

In State v. Bell, 92 Utah Adv. Rep. 22, 26, 30 (1988),
in footnote 22, this Court favorably noted this discussion by
Justice Zimmerman in State v. Bishop.
-

Q

by evidence of Holderfs commission of another
crime.
JA.

at 584.
Article I, sections 7 and 12 of the Utah Constitution and

the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the federal constitution
guarantee due process and a fair trial to a criminal defendant.

In

his concurrence in State v. Bishop, Justice Zimmerman pointed out
"[1 language in some of our cases, such as State v. Saunders and
State v, Tarafa, plainly states that permitting the jury to consider
otherwise inadmissible bad character evidence for the sole purpose
of determining guilt denies a defendant due process in violation of
the state and federal constitutions."

Bishop, 753 P.2d at 497.

Mug shot evidence which is merely cumulative does not fit
within the identity exception of Rule 404(b).

The inherently

prejudicial nature of such evidence has the effect of suggesting to
the jury that the defendant was involved in prior criminal activity
and outweighs any minimal probative value.

As a result, the

admission and publication of such evidence violates both Rules 403
and 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence (1983) and the defendant's right
to due process under the state and federal constitutions.
The issue of whether mug shots are inadmissible in a
criminal prosecution due to their prejudicial effect has never been
directly decided by this Court.3

In State v. Owens, 388 P.2d 797

3

The paucity of Utah case law dealing with this issue
despite the fact that mug shots are commonly utilized in criminal
law enforcement may be indicative of a consensus by trial judges and
prosecutors that such evidence is inherently prejudicial and
therefore rarely admitted in a criminal trial.
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(Utah 1964), the defendant claimed that the trial court erred in
admitting testimony "concerning the presentation by police to [a
witness] of 'mug1 shots and [the witness] identification of the
appellant in one of these pictures."

_id. at 797.

In Owens, defense

counsel did not object to the admissibility of the "mug" shots, and
the Court appeared to rule on the admissibility of the witness1
prior identification rather than the admissibility of the "mug"
shots themselves.
A careful reading of Owens does not show the Court
condoning the use of mug shots nor determining their admissibility
under the predecessor to Rule 404(b).

The Owens court relied upon

State v. Aguirre, 158 Cal.App.2d 304, 322 P.2d 478 (Cal. App. 1958)
which held that a witness who identified a defendant at trial could
testify as to her prior identification of the defendant at a lineup
and from photographs.

JEd. at 798, fn 1.

Utah cases citing Owens do not refer to it in regard to
the admission of "mug" shot photographs; instead, cases which cite
Owens rely on its holding that evidence of prior identification is
admissible.

See e.g., State v. Jiron, 492 P.2d 983 (Utah 1972).
In State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942, 945 (Utah 1982), the

defendant claimed that he was denied a fair trial where the trial
court admitted "mug" shots as evidence.

This Court noted that

"McCardell's arguments on this point clearly have merit" (J^d. at
946) but did not address the issue due to counsel's failure to make
a specific objection.
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In the present case, the prosecutor attempted to
introduce and publish the "mug" shot book and "mug" shot of
Mr. Albretson on the grounds that the evidence was necessary to
demonstrate the difference between Mr. Albretson's in-person
appearance with that of the "mug" shot (T. 68-70).

However, an

argument that Mr. Albretson's mug shot was admissible under the
rubric of the identity language of Rule 404(b) is not convincing
since Ms. Leavitt made a positive in-court identification of
Mr. Albretson.
In Commonwealth v. Trowery, 235 A.2d 171 (Pa. Super.,
1967), the state made a similar argument to the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania.

In Trowery, a witness to a bank robbery identified

the defendant after an examination of photographs from police
records.

Over defendant's objection, his photographs were admitted

into evidence.

The Court, first noting that it is "almost too

axiomatic to repeat the well-established common law rule
that . . . proof which shows or tends to show that the accused is
guilty of the commission of other crimes . . .

at other times is

incompetent and inadmissible for . . . showing the commission of the
particular crime charged," (J^d. ) analyzed the admission of the mug
shot for purposes of identification in the following passage:
The Commonwealth argues that this evidence is not
adduced to show the commission of the particular
crime charged, but merely for the purpose of
identification, and therefore its admission does
not constitute reversible error. This argument
weakens rather than strengthens the Commonwealth's
case, for in a real sense evidence of prior crimes
may have probative value in proving the commission
of the crime charged, but is excluded because the
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prejudice stemming from its introduction far
overshadows that value. In a case where the
evidence is introduced merely for the purpose of
identification, most of the probative value of the
evidence is lost while the prejudicial effect
remains undiminished.
_Id. at 172-3.
In State v. Kutzen, 620 P.2d 258 (Hawaii App. 1980), the
court held that admission of the defendant's "mug" shots was
reversible error and observed that "the admission of the photographs
into evidence after [the witness] made an unequivocal in-court
identification of the defendants was unnecessary."

J[cL at 263.

In the instant case, the analysis by the Pennsylvania and
Hawaii courts is particularly compelling.

Ms. Leavitt testified

that she positively and immediately identified the defendant as her
assailant from the photo spread, State's Exhibit 8.

Ms. Leavitt

further made a positive in-court identification of the defendant.
Hence, the highly prejudicial "mug" shot evidence was cumulative and
had no probative value in determining whether Mr. Albretson was, in
fact, the person who committed the burglary in this case.

It

therefore was not necessary to prove identity and was inadmissible
under Rule 404(b).
The mug shot evidence was also inadmissible under Rule
403.

As was the case in Holder, the evidence in the present case

was "merely cumulative" and any minimal probative value was
substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect of the
implication conveyed by the mug shot that Mr. Albretson had been
involved in prior criminal activity.
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Furthermore, the mug shot evidence constituted bad
character evidence which permeated the entire proceeding.

The bad

character evidence was cumulative and unnecessary for the State's
case and introduced solely to establish guilt, in violation of due
process.
The jury's perception of Mr. Albretson was particularly
important in this case where he raised an alibi defense (R. 22, 24)
and where the State's case rested on the identification testimony of
a single witness who viewed her assailant for only three seconds
before becoming unconscious.

The mug shots suggested to the jury

that Mr. Albretson had been involved in criminal activity, thereby
tainting the jury's view of Mr. Albretson and his defense.

Absent

the damaging mug shot evidence, there is a reasonable likelihood the
jury would have reached a different decision in the instant case and
concluded that Ms. Leavitt made an incorrect identification of the
defendant.

B.
PROCEDURES UTILIZED BY THE COURT TO MINIMIZE THE
PREJUDICIAL EFFECTS OF ADMITTING AND PUBLISHING
THE DEFENDANT'S MUG SHOT WERE INEFFECTIVE.
In recognition of the inherent prejudice of mug shot
photos, the trial court in the present case granted defendant's
motion in limine to exclude his mug shot from evidence (R. 51).
However, in the immediacy of the trial setting and over defense
counsel's objection, the Court allowed the introduction and
publication of the defendant's mug shot with its legends masked by
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tape (T. 67 and 72). Masking the legends of a double-shot, front
and profile mug shot of the defendant with tape did not mask the
nature of the photos nor their prejudicial effect from the mind of a
juror.

See Barnes v. U.S., 365 F.2d 509, 510-11 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
The Colorado Supreme Court has criticized the use of

double-shot front and profile mug shots even where they have been
doctored to exclude information because they "necessarily import
prior criminality to the defendant . . . "

(People v. Burgarin, 507

P.2d 879 (Colo. 1973)) .
Illustrative of the conspicuous and distinctive
appearance of the mug shot photo is an exchange between the trial
judge and defense counsel as recorded in Richardson v. State, 536
S.W.2d 221 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).

Defense counsel requested that

the trial judge excise the legend on defendant's mug shot before
admitting it into evidence.

The judge refused, responding, "No,

sir; with that (the legend) on there.

There is no way that I can

keep a mug shot from looking like a mug shot.

I can cut them in two

and trim it, but a mug shot looks like a mug shot."

rd. at 222.

The D.C. Circuit Court has emphasized the universally
recognized characteristics of the mug shot and the accompanying
inference of criminal activity.

In Barnes v. U.S., 365 F.2d 509

(D.C. Cir. 1966), the Court commented:

"The double-shot picture,

with front and profile shots alongside each other, is so familiar,
from 'wanted1 posters in the post office, motion pictures and
television, that the inference that the person involved has a
criminal record, or has at least been in trouble with the police, is
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natural, perhaps automatic."

rd. at 510-11.

Furthermore, in Barnes, as in the instant case, tape was
placed over the legends on the mug shot photo before its admission
into evidence.

The Court, in a particularly relevant passage,

pointed out that:
The rudimentary tape cover placed over the prison
numbers on the photograph, and over the notations
on the reverse side, neither disguised the nature
of the picture nor avoided the prejudice. If
anything, by emphasizing that something was being
hidden, the steps taken here to disguise the
nature of the picture may well have heightened the
importance of the picture and the prejudice in the
minds of the jury. (Emphasis added.)

In a memorandum decision, the New York Supreme Court
likewise held that tape over the mug shot legend more probably
heightened rather than lessened prejudice in the minds of the jury.
In People v. Carroll, 402 N.Y.S.2d 8 (N.Y. 1978), the Court wrote
that "[wjhile the prison numerals across defendant's chest were
taped over in the photographs, this could have had the effect of
emphasizing their nature rather than ameliorating the problem."

Id,

at 8-9.
Further still, in a case where the triaL court deleted
the legend on the frontal view of the mug shot (the legend on the
profile view was left alone since it was seemingly difficult to
read), the appellate court reversed the defendant's conviction
notwithstanding defense counsel's consent to admission of the mug
shots and a subsequent failure to raise a claim of error in
admitting the mug shots in a motion for a new trial.
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In People v.

Clark, 297 N.E.2d 395 (111. App. 1973), the Court reasoned that:
[I]n fact, an examination of the mug shots after
the deletion could only lead the jury to speculate
as to what information the deleted portion of the
photograph had contained. The prejudicial effect
of such evidence is of such magnitude as to
overcome any relevancy or probative value that it
may have had. (Emphasis added.)
16.

at 397.
The case law represented above recognizes that the

configuration of a mug shot is distinct and readily identifiable as
such and that the procedures utilized by the trial court did not
minimize the prejudicial effects of the mug shot.

Indeed, not only

was prejudice not minimized by the Court's actions, but prejudice
was very likely to have been exacerbated.

Placing tape over the

legends imprinted on the profile and frontal double-shot of the
defendant does not obviate the fact that the photo is a mug shot.
Nor did the masking suggest that the mug shot was taken
incident to the offense for which Mr. Albretson was before the
Court.

On the contrary, the photo itself, as well as testimony

elicited by the prosecution, predated the mug shot as to the instant
offense, thereby suggesting to the jury prior criminal activity by
the defendant, thus violating Rules 403 and 404(b), Utah Rules of
Evidence (1983) and Mr. Albretsonfs fundamental right to due process
and a fair trial.
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c.
ADMISSION INTO EVIDENCE AND PUBLICATION OF THE
DEFENDANT'S MUG SHOT CONSTITUTES PREJUDICIAL ERROR.
The admission into evidence and publication of the
defendant's mug shot constitutes reversible error.

In this case,

where no physical evidence existed and the State's case hinged on
the identification by a single witness who saw the perpetrator for
less than three seconds before being knocked unconscious, the jury's
perception of the defendant was critical.

The mug shot suggested

prior criminal conduct by Mr. Albretson, negatively impacting on the
jury's perception of him and its determination as to his propensity
to commit crime and the credibility of his alibi defense.
Although Utah has not dealt directly with the instant
issue, it has found comparable errors where the jury has been
informed of other criminal activity by the defendant to be
reversible.

See e.g. State v. Saunders.

Furthermore, courts in

other jurisdictions have found errors similar to that in the instant
case to be reversible.
in State v. Kutzen, 620 P.2d 259 (Hawaii App. 1980), the
admission into evidence of photos consisting of double-shot frontal
and profile views of each defendant, with white paper folded and
stapled over the lower portion of the photos, constituted reversible
error where the State's entire case relied on the identification of
one eyewitness.
In Johnson v. Commonwealth, 345 S.E.2d 303 (Va. App.
1986), the admission into evidence of defendant's mug shot was found
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to be reversible error.

While the Court noted that it was not error

to admit the photo when there exists a defense of misidentification
and the State demonstrates a need to introduce the photo, two
further criteria must be met as enunciated by the Court in United
States v. Harrington, 490 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1973) (see also State v.
Tate, 341 S.E.2d 380 (S.C. 1986); Sloane v. State, 437 So.2d 16
(Miss. 1983)).

Those criteria are (1) the photographs themselves

must not imply a prior criminal record and (2) the manner of
introduction must not draw particular attention to the source or
implications of the photographs.

In Johnson, the Court held that

reversible error existed because the mug shot legend would alert a
member of the jury as to the nature of the photo and its
implications.

345 S.E.2d at 308.

An analysis of the instant case would similarly warrant
reversal under the Harrington test.

(1) The prosecutor failed to

establish a need for the introduction of the photo, (2) the photo of
the defendant was unmistakably a mug shot, and (3) such information
was reinforced by the photo itself and the testimony elicited by the
prosecution as to its source.
In State v. Moore, 495 P.2d 448 (Ariz. 1972), the Arizona
Supreme Court held that the verbalization of "mug shot" when
referring to a photograph was reversible error as an implication of
prior criminal activity.

The Moore court further approved a

previous Arizona Court of Appeals decision which held as prejudicial
error the admission of a mug shot where the legend was removed but
consisted of a double-shot frontal and profile photo.
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State v.

Cumbo, 451 P.2d 333 (Ariz. App. 1969).
In a memorandum decision in People v. Carroll, 402
N.Y.S.2d 8 (N.Y. 1978), admission into evidence of a mug shot with
the legends taped over constituted reversible error.

Reversible

error also existed in People v. Clark, 297 N.E.2d 395 (111. App.
1973), where the photo was clearly shown not to have been taken as a
result of the charge for which defendant was being tried.

And in

Commonwealth v. Trowery, 235 A.2d 171 (Pa. Super. 1967), reversible
error was found when a mug shot of the defendant was admitted into
evidence for the purpose of identification.
In the instant case, it was prejudicial error to allow
defendant's mug shot into evidence because it suggested to the jury
that the defendant had been involved in prior criminal conduct.
Because there is a reasonable likelihood the jury would have reached
a different conclusion absent the mug shot evidence, the defendant's
conviction should be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.

POINT II
FAILURE TO GRANT THE DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO
STATE'S SURPRISE ALIBI REBUTTAL WITNESS VIOLATED
UTAH CODE ANN. §77-14-2 AND DENIED DEFENDANT DUE
PROCESS.
Utah Code Ann. §77-14-2(1953 as amended) provides:
77-14-2. Alibi—Notice requirements—Witness
lists. (1) A defendant, whether or not written
demand has been made, who intends to offer
evidence of an alibi shall, not less than ten days
before trial or at such time as the court may
allow, file and serve on the prosecuting attorney
a notice, in writing, of his intention to claim
alibi. The notice shall contain specific
information as to the place where the defendant
- 20 -

claims to have been at the time of the alleged
offense and, as particularly as is known to the
defendant or his attorney, the names and addresses
of the witnesses by whom he proposes to establish
alibi. The prosecuting attorney, not more than
five days after receipt of the list provided
herein or at such other time as the court may
direct, shall file and serve the defendant with
the addresses, as particularly as are known to
him, of the witnesses the state proposes to offer
to contradict or impeach the defendant's alibi
evidence.
(2) The defendant and prosecuting attorney
shall be under a continuing duty to disclose the
names and addresses of additional witnesses which
come to the attention of either party after filing
their alibi witness lists.
(3) If a defendant or prosecuting attorney
fails to comply with the requirements of this
section, the court may exclude evidence offered to
establish or rebut alibi. However, the defendant
may always testify on his own behalf concerning
alibi.
(4) The court may, for good cause shown, waive
the requirements of this section.
The statute requires not only that the defendant give
notice of a claim of alibi and information regarding witnesses but
also requires the State to be under a continuing obligation to
provide information to the defense regarding witnesses it intends to
call in rebuttal.

As a result, Utah Code Ann. §77-14-2 is a

balanced statute which is geared toward eliminating surprise.
The requirement of reciprocal discovery by the State
saves the statute from a challenge similar to the one
argued in Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973).

successfully

In Wardius, the

United States Supreme Court reversed the conviction of an Oregon
defendant who had been required to provide notice and discovery of
his alibi defense without the State's having been required to give
reciprocal notice of its rebuttal to the alibi.
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The Court stated:

. . . the State may not insist that trials be run
as a "search for truth" so far as defense
witnesses are concerned, while maintaining "poker
game" secrecy for its own witnesses. It is
fundamentally unfair to require a defendant to
divulge the details of his own case while at the
same time subjecting him to the hazard of surprise
concerning refutation of the very pieces of
evidence he disclosed to the State.
Ld. at 475-6.
Consistent with the Wardius court, this Court stated that
"[t]he overriding consideration in evaluating any notice-of-alibi
claim must be the avoidance of unfair surprise or prejudice to
either party, not an exaltation of technical formalities."

State v.

Ortiz, 712 P.2d 218, 220 (Utah 1985).
In the instant case, the trial court's failure to enforce
the reciprocity requirement contained in Utah Code Ann. §77-14-2
(1953 as amended) resulted in unfair surprise or prejudice to
Mr. Albretson and effectively denied him due process as guaranteed
by Article I, sections 7 and 12 of the Utah Constitution, and the
fifth and fourteenth amendments to the federal constitution.
Mr. Albretson filed and served on the State a Notice of
Alibi and furnished the names of all alibi witnesses and the
necessary information for contacting them.

In addition, Ms. Davis,

the witness whose testimony was later refuted by the State's
surprise rebuttal witness, was known to the State before defense
counsel was appointed.

She had given a full written statement to

the investigating officer prior to appointment of counsel (T. 101,
124).

(See Addendum D ) . The statement was then given to defense

counsel in the requisite Reply to Notice of Alibi, filed on July 31,
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1987, by the prosecution (R. 49-50).

The Reply included the name of

the investigative detective who had taken the defense alibi witness1
statement and copy of her statement.
witnesses were listed.

No other alibi rebuttal

(See Addendum C ) .

In our criminal justice system, where prosecution of an
individual is by the State, there is inherent inequality to which a
requirement of reciprocal alibi discovery is a necessary redress.
Recognizing that the State's resources provide an enhanced ability
to find and present surprise alibi rebuttal, as contrasted to the
defendant's relative lack of ability, the Supreme Court in Wardius
stated in a lengthy footnote that any imbalance in discovery rights
should work in a defendant's favor.

Wardius, 412 U.S. at 476, fn. 9,

In the instant case, the State had continuous
investigative access to Ms. Davis.

The State also was in possession

of Ms. Davis' written statement within a very short time of the
defendant's arrest.

Thus, the State had weeks to learn of possible

witnesses to rebut any aspect of Ms. Davis' statement—one such
aspect being the route taken through the canyons.

To allow the

State to later present a surprise alibi rebuttal witness only
exacerbates the imbalance noted by the Wardius court.
Furthermore, circumstances suggest that the State did
have information which would have required it to disclose the
identity of its alibi rebuttal witness in conformity with Utah Code
Ann. §77-14-2.
The prosecution's method of examining Ms. Davis denotes a
design to elicit a commitment about the route traveled in
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anticipation of the rebuttal.

The following is excerpted from the

cross-examination of Ms. Davis by the prosecution:
Q.

So before you went to the mountains, you went
to your mother's?

Q.

And from there where did you go?

A.

We went up to Parley's Canyon.

Q.

Tell me the route, v/ould, you, please?

A.

Went up—after I left my mother's shop, we
went up into Parley's Canyon, up in through
Emigration and back down out of Emigration.
We went back to the house, had lunch.

Q.

Let me ask you this.

You went up Parley's.

That's the main freeway?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And how did you get to Emigration?

A.

I took the first exit off the freeway, went
down in that way, back up in through
Emigration and out.

Q.

Is that the East Canyon exit?

A.

I believe so.

Q.

Where you go over the mountain then you come
back Emigration?

A.

Yes.

Q.

You didn't come back down from Parley's and go
up around and come through Emigration Canyon
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through the zoo?
A.

No.

Q.

In fact, when you came back down, you passed
the zoo.

It was on your left-hand side, I

guess.
A.

That's right.

Q.

Are you sure you went up Parley's Canyon?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Are you sure you made that little detour over
Emigration Canyon?

A.

Yes, I am.

Q.

You're sure you came back dov/n Emigration
Canyon?

A.
(T. 96-7).

Yes.

If the State was aware of the closure of SR65 before

trial and simply waited to confirm the route from the witness before
calling an undisclosed rebuttal witness, then the State purposely
avoided the disclosure requirement and thwarted the due process
requirements of alibi notice.
Utah Code Ann. §77-14-2 provides in subsection (4) that
"[t]he court may, for good cause shown, waive the requirements of
this section."

A survey of the Utah case law dealing with

subsection (4) demonstrates adherence to the Wardius court's
admonishment against unfair surprise.

In State v. Ortiz, 712 P.2d

218, 220 (Utah 1985), the Court pointed out that n[t]he overriding
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consideration in evaluating any notice-of-alibi claim must be the
avoidance of unfair surprise or prejudice to either party.

..."

In cases where this Court has upheld the waiver of the requirements
of the statute (or its predecessor), the opposing party has had
actual or implied knowledge of the rebuttal witnesses or their
testimony.

See State v. Ortiz, 712 P.2d 218 (Utah 1985); State v.

Peterson, 681 P.2d 1210 (Utah 1984); State v. Haddenham, 585 P.2d
447 (Utah 1978); and State v. Case, 547 P.2d 221 (Utah 1976).
In the present case, defense counsel had no actual or
implied prior knowledge of the rebuttal witness.

The surprise alibi

rebuttal witness1 identity and nature of testimony were only
divulged to the defense after it had closed its case (T. 115).
Furthermore, the prosecutor offered no grounds for waiving the
requirements of the statute (T. 15-124) and the judge made no
finding that the State had established good cause for such waiver
(T. 124).

(See Addendum E for transcript of ruling).
In the instant case, the presentation of a surprise alibi

rebuttal witness greatly affected the ability of defense counsel to
present her case, to accurately represent Ms. Davis1 testimony and
to fairly cross-examine the surprise witness in an adequate and
informed manner.
In State v. Frye, 581 P.2d 528 (Or. App. 1978), the Court
ruled that failure to give the defense notice that a police officer
might be called to refute evidence of an alibi constituted
reversible error since:
Had the State complied, defendant would have
checked the theory presented by the State's
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rebuttal witness to see whether it was plausible.
Defendant might have found a number of defects in
the theory, but without the opportunity to check
it prior to trial, defendant was left with an
inadequate, uninformed cross-examination. The
State was given more than ample opportunity to
investigate and explore loopholes in defendant's
theory. Wardius required defendant be given equal
opportunity.
Id. at 530.

In the instant case, the surprise rebuttal witness left

defense counsel unprepared for informed cross-examination and unable
to investigate and explore problems with the witness1 testimony.
Furthermore, defense counsel was unable to investigate and subpoena
witnesses for surrebuttal.
The State's case was based upon an eyewitness
identification and subject to all the problems inherent in such
cases.

(See State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986)).

The lack of

physical evidence left the jury to decide the facts solely upon the
credibility of the witnesses.

The credibility of defendant's alibi

witnesses was therefore of utmost importance to the jury, and in
such a case, allowing the testimony of the surprise rebuttal witness
was prejudicial error.
The avoidance of unfair surprise or prejudice is the
overriding consideration in a notice-of-alibi claim and, in the
present case where defendant had no actual or implied knowledge of
the State's rebuttal witness or the nature of his testimony,
defendant's conviction should be reversed and the case remanded for
a new trial.
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CONCLUSION
Defendant/Appellant, DOUGLAS R. ALBRETSON, respectfully
requests that this Court reverse his conviction and renand the case
for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted this

/

day of December, 1988.

DEBRA K. LOY
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

jOA4f C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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this
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ADDENDUM A

FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
SaJt Lake County, Utah
DEBRA K. LOY, (#3901)
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.

mi 9 2^1987
*

333 South Second East

H 0ixon

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:
532-5444

8y

Hm6^fde^3rd

Oist. Court

^~J o«n..tvcierk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:
:

NOTICE OF INTENT TO RELY
ON THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI

Plaintiff
v.

:

DOUGLAS R. ALBRETSEN,

:
:

Case No. CR87-810
HONORABLE RAYMOND S. UNO

Defendant
Pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §77-14-2 (1953
as amended), the defendant, DOUGLAS R. ALBRETSEN, by and through his
attorney of record, DEBRA K. LOY, herein gives to the Salt Lake
County Attorney's Office and to the Court notice that he intends to
claim the defense of alibi.
The defendant intends to call the following witnesses for
the purpose of establishing his alibi:
1.

BRENDA DAVIS, 616 East 7th South, Salt Lake City, Utah

2.

Cindy Edwards, (Address Unknown)

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this £2-

day-3fcpj, 1987

DEBRA K. LOY
Attorney for Defendant

(J

DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the County Attorney's
Office, 231 East Fourth South, Salt Lake C±ty#"^tttah -this
J u l y , 1987.

JUL 2 :i 1987

day of

ADDENDUM B

FILEd -CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt Lake County Utah
DEBRA K. LOY,

(#3901)

E1LMBDI
¥J

JUL 2 8 1987

Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:
532-5444

aatU C'erk 3rd Disl Ccofl
Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

AMENDED
NOTICE" OF INTENT TO RELY
ON THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI

Plaintiff
V.
DOUGLAS R. ALBRETSEN,

Case No. CR87-810
HONORABLE RAYMOND S. UNO

Defendant
Pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §77-14-2 (1953
as amended), the defendant, DOUGLAS R. ALBRETSEN, by and through his
attorney of record, DEBRA K. LOY, herein gives to the Salt Lake
County Attorney's Office and to the Court notice that he intends to
claim the defense of alibi.
The defendant intends to call the following witnesses for
the purpose of establishing his alibi:
1.

BRENDA DAVIS, 1022 1/2 South 800 East, Salt Lake City,

2.

Cindy Edwards, (Address Unknown)

Utah

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^L~[ day July, 1987.

JjA^

A rU

DEBRA K. LOY
I
Attorney for Defendant

DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the County Attorney's
Office, 231 East Fourth South, Salt Lake City, Utah this K / day of
/

ADDENDUM C

rlLED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt Lake County, Utah
DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney
ROBERT L. STOTT
Deputy County Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900

ur.

AUG -3^1987

* ^ H Dixon Hirdlsy-CI^K 3ra O -,; Cc^r

\ "~fV

Cr- "> N C O'k
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
REPLY TO NOTICE
OF ALIBI

Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. CR 87-810
DOUGLAS R. ALBRETSEN,
Honorable Raymond S. Uno
Defendant.
COMES NOW the State of Utah, by and through Deputy County
Attorney, ROBERT L. STOTT, and informs the defendant, DOUGLAS R.
ALBRETSEN,

that

in

response

to his Notice

of Alibi, the State

proposes to offer the following witness:
1.

Officer Brandt Hutchison
Salt Lake City Police Department

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this jSfJ^day of July, 1987.

H t. STOTT <\V • '
ROBERT
Deputy County Attorney

REPLY TO NOTICE OF ALIBI
Case No. CR87-810
Page two

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on this £1*

day of

\,*t(P(,

, 1987, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Reply to
Notice of Alibi

to DEBRA K. LOY, Attorney

for Defendant, at the

address stated below.

Secretary
DEBRA K. LOY
Attorney for the Defendant
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
sc/0058d/72605
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ADDENDUM E

1

its being open or not, you would have been aware that issue

2

might arise today.

3

MR. STOTT:

A

5

It doesn't matter whether I am aware

of an issue or not.

The question is what was available.

She had what I had.

I donft have to go talk to a witness

17 times or 18 times.

The police talked to that witness

6
and had a statement that is in verbatim what she testified

7

to on the stand.

No changes, no difference, no indication

8

what her route was.

'

every little thing and then give it to the defense,

10

It's not my duty to go up and check

I gave the witnesses, I gave the statement, and

IX I it wasn't until she got on the stand that I was able to ask
the question and found out what route she took.

12

MS. LOY:

13
statement.

For the record, it was not a verbatim

The main points were all raised.

14
THE COURT:

15

Based upon what has been represented,

the Court is going to deny the motion to have this witness

16

excluded as far as the testimony is concerned, and we may

17

have to see what he has got to say.

18 I route they can go around.

Maybe there's another

I don't know.

I don't go up that

19 I way,
2Q I

MS. LOY:

Thank you.

I will need just a minute,

[Whereupon, the following proceedings were had
in open court in the presence of the jury:]
22 •
23
24
25

I
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